

ONE DAY SCULPTURE

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CHRISTOPHER BRADDOCK THE FORCE OF THE MOMENT

For one-hour on the 24th of January, 2008, Alicia Frankovich's leg was seen jutting out of a first floor office window on Ponsonby Road, Auckland. This gesture that is Frankovich's *Flying Fox*, so slim and formless and yet so open to interpretation, relies on us—her audience—to add value.

For more than a decade, influential writers such as Peggy Phelan and Kristine Stiles have borrowed the terms of metaphor and metonymy from structural linguistics. They have applied these terms—within the field of performance studies—to articulate the metonymic power of the live and unstable 'moment' in variance to the reproductive and securing qualities of metaphor. This paper expands on these terms of reference, applying the partial and short-lived characteristics of metonymy to the temporality of the one-day sculpture phenomenon. Frankovich's leg as a part object, and the momentary duration of its appearance, function metonymically to frustrate a desire for wholeness, reproduction and permanence—all qualities upheld by the conventional museum or gallery context. Moreover, the partiality of the metonymic solicits (by virtue of its inherent lack) a desire *in* the body/s of the audience for completion. Frankovich's one-hour 'sculpture' (not unlike Erwin Wurn's one-minute sculptures) is so forcefully reductive of the 'whole' picture that it becomes a transformative gesture that is strongly and openly legible.

From this perspective, notions of 'engagement' between artist and audiences are partial and always lacking. It is this field of redundancy that performatively *draws*

out Frankovich's audience as they desire closure both in object and duration. This is the *force of the moment* that questions the ethical and aesthetic consequences of the operations of scopic representation, longevity and permanent collection.

Flying Fox:

For one-hour on the 24th of January, 2008, Alicia Frankovich's leg was seen jutting out of a first floor office window above the Fairy Shop on Ponsonby Road, Auckland.¹

While the invitation to the performance *Flying Fox* indicated that the event would take place in her father's 1st floor office, on arrival audiences were confused to be left outside. Following a period of discussion we settled into looking at the leg, clad as it was in jeans and Frankovich's signature shoe: an *adidas* hybrid between a running and gymnast shoe. We wondered how the work might 'develop'. With the exception of a few foot movements to avoid cramps on the artist's part, the performance stayed the same for the hour and the audience stayed in the driveway milling about and occasionally looking up for progress.



ALICIA FRANKOVICH, *FLYING FOX*, 2008

Frankovich describes the work as soliciting notions of being half-in-and-half-out, not allowing entry, of setting up an event which will, by nature, fail expectations. She also views the live performance as necessary for the occasion but redundant in the sense of the work's outcome (Frankovich 2008). *Flying Fox* was never videoed and lives on as a photographic print exhibited exactly one week later at Starkwhite Gallery, Auckland. Frankovich is at some pains to outline her lameness: lame object, lame leg, and lame gymnast. Frankovich is a failed gymnast and much of her work is in response to the traumatic events of 1992 when, while participating in the National New Zealand Championships, she found herself unable to perform. She walked out of the competition never to talk with her coach again and never to continue as a

¹ This paper draws on various sections of my recent PhD thesis. See in particular: 1.3 *Introducing Metaphor & Metonymy*; 4.1 *Performative Sculpture/the Object of Performance*; 4.2 *Alicia Frankovich's Flying Fox*; and 6.3 *The Force of the Pendulum* (Braddock 2008: 54-58, 105-114, 171-177). I acknowledge Mark Jackson who I am indebted to for many of the critical re-workings of my PhD manuscript.

gymnast.² During our discussion she mentions her gymnast colleague Zoe Bell, who also presented at the 1992 National New Zealand Championships, and how Bell's career has leaped forward, in particular as Uma Thurman's body double in Tarantino's *Kill Bill 2*. This exemplifies Frankovich's sense of failure and lameness deeply entrenched in most of her artwork: a steady deferring of anything that might structurally function or represent a whole. This is a calculated deferral that plays itself out in multifaceted ways: in the audiences' expectations around the event; in the object that is the photograph mediating the experience; and in the partiality of her presence manifest as this part object—the leg—jutting and disorienting in difference to its normative function and spatial axis. It is this lameness that strikes at the force of *Flying Fox*.

A striking aspect of Frankovich's *Flying Fox* was the conceit on the part of the artist in inviting us to view her leg jutting from a first floor office window for one hour. This gesture, like Morris' *Untitled (Box for Standing)* (1961), was so slim and formless and yet so open to interpretation; relying on us—her audience—to add value. In other words, *Flying Fox*'s success lies in its ability to fail expectations both formally (aesthetically) and as a public event.

Frankovich invests a similar sense of functional frustration in her work *To Veer: A Sudden Change Of Opinion, Subject Or Type Of Behaviour* (2007).³ Between the walls of a Romanesque chapel on Lake Como, Frankovich's body was wrapped and suspended in a rope and foam structure resembling an 'acromat' support system used by gymnasts when working on the trampoline. Held by two people to each side of the trampoline, the acromat can be suddenly pulled taut in the event that the gymnast fails to correctly recover from a somersault.⁴ Presented as a static photographic image the artist's body is, in Frankovich's words, cocooned, defunct, inactive and lacking (2008). But most interesting is her comment that, for the audience, the work is about a desire to activate the structure. I interpret this as a desire to undo undesired outcomes, to undo the failure at the heart of Frankovich's tangle.

² See my 2008 interview with Frankovich as well as Rob McKenzie's "Alicia Frankovich" (2006).

³ *To Veer: A Sudden Change Of Opinion, Subject Or Type Of Behaviour* (2007) was shown at *Corso Aperto* during the Advanced Course in Visual Arts, a workshop with the artist Joan Jonas held by Fondazione Ratti and curated by Anna Daneri, Roberto Pinto and Cesare Pietroiusti, on Lake Como, Italy, 2-21 July, 2007.

⁴ The acromat was more literally referenced by Frankovich in her work *I'll Teach You about Parametres: 9 Overhead Safety Belt Systems, Acromat & Net* (2007).



ALICIA FRANKOVICH,
*TO VEER: A SUDDEN CHANGE OF OPINION, SUBJECT OR TYPE OF
BEHAVIOUR*, 2007

To summarise at this point, these works by Frankovich interest me on several levels: her leg—or cocooned body—as part subject, transformed into *part object* as she is both the subject and object of the work; the performances’ unstable moment or non-duration; their lameness (or sense of unemployment); and how these combined factors contribute to the works’ sense of failure. And it is precisely this quality of lack or redundancy that ‘draws out’ audiences in a desire for completion or closure.

From such a perspective, this paper references literature on the part object in conjunction with writing on the nature of the ‘live’ moment in performance, where both fields of enquiry have activated a legacy of structural linguistics that employs the operations of metaphor and metonymy. On the one hand, writers such as Rosalind Krauss and Yves Alain Bois—employing Roland Barthes’ critique of George Bataille’s *The History of the Eye*—articulate a ‘formlessness’ characteristic of the part object; erosion as a metonymic part of a larger whole. On the other hand the operations of metaphor and metonymy are employed by writers such as Peggy Phelan and Kristine Stiles engaging with notions of performativity and the problem of how the ‘live’ moment is recorded, documented or archived.⁵ They have applied these terms—within the field of performance studies—to articulate the metonymic power of the live and unstable ‘moment’ in variance to the reproductive and securing qualities of metaphor. This has particular relevance to the one-day-sculpture phenomenon which shares these characteristics of the unstable moment in difference to permanent objects housed in long-term collections.

I will argue that Frankovich’s leg as a part object, and the momentary duration of its appearance, function metonymically to frustrate a desire for wholeness, reproduction

⁵ The operations of metaphor and metonymy are also employed by Jane Blocker who sees metonymy as functioning as a kind of ‘somatic language’ where, akin to the experience of pain, performativity integrates mind and body in an understanding of being embodied *in* our bodies (2004: 34).

and durability—all qualities upheld by the conventional museum or gallery context. This is what I am calling the *force of the moment* that questions the ethical and aesthetic consequences of the operations of scopic representation, longevity and permanent collection. Moreover, the partiality of the metonymic solicits (by virtue of its inherent lack) a desire *in* the body/s of the audience for completion. Frankovich's one-hour 'sculpture' *Flying Fox*—not unlike Erwin Wurn's one-minute sculptures such as *Open your trousers, put flowers in it and don't think...* (2002)—is so forcefully reductive of the 'whole' picture that it becomes a transformative gesture that forces us, her audience, into engagement. My overarching argument, that I will return to again, is that these works are about what is not 'present,' all that her viewers miss and all the parts of her body that are absent.

This is to emphasize a notion of making toward disappearance or loss that is crucial to my own art practice. My works such as *Back* (2008) are videoed in private and projected in unpredictable ways, both in terms of scale and spatial orientation.⁶ I try to question the category of the 'live' by never offering up the 'presence' of my body, by always facilitating its loss. To this end the image of my back moves in and out of the frame, at times leaving my audiences in complete darkness. At the same time the insistent and spatially dislocated sound track (in the foyer of the gallery) indicates that the activity continues out of frame. This engagement plays out as moving images of my body that vacillate between my body as object and subject of the work. In a similar argument to the one I present for Frankovich, the works are both formally partial and ambivalent toward the body they 'represent' while the body/s of my audience can find themselves alone and noncoincidental with the process of making (the sound track) that continues in an adjacent space.



CHRISTOPHER BRADDOCK, *BACK*, 2008



CHRISTOPHER BRADDOCK, *BACK*, 2008

⁶ *Back* (2008) (looped dvd, 59.54 minutes) was part of the exhibition *The Artist Will Be Present* in July-August 2008 at St Paul St Gallery, Auckland University of Technology, Auckland.

Two enduring historical works that stem from similar interests are Bruce Nauman's *Thighing* (1967) and *Stamping in the Studio* (1968). For *Thighing* he films himself manipulating the skin of his own thigh in a close-up cropped shot. For *Stamping in the Studio* he walks about the studio for 62 minutes, at various points in and out of the frame while the sound track continues. These early films and video-tapes are the objects by which we view actions and gestures that Nauman found himself engaging in on an everyday basis in his studio. As Paul Schimmel writes: "For Nauman, the repetition of such simple actions had the potential to force the viewer into his loop. Eschewing narrative, he opted for a type of recognition that could ruthlessly wear down the viewer, for an engaging tension that would never be resolved" (1998: 91). Similarly, for Frankovich, I argue for an audacious wearing down of the viewer that is more about her audiences undoing an inherent failure in the works and in the object/subject that is the artist.

Bois and Krauss employ Barthes' structuralist analysis of Bataille's *History of the Eye* in order to underscore an interpretation of a story-line, not as a series of characters and events, but as an object—an eye—that mutates across metaphoric axes, one globular and one liquid:

For the grid this object produces is constructed from the axis of shapes (the chain of globular forms that links eye to sun to egg to testicles) and an axis of fluids (a series of liquids that mutates from tears to yolk to semen). It is the crossing of these two axes at their multiple points, Barthes argues, that produces the precise images with which Bataille operates - such as when the sun, metamorphorized as eye and yolk, is described as 'flaccid luminosity' - and gives rise to the phrase 'the urinary liquefaction of the sky.' (Bois and Krauss 1997: 154-155)⁷

This is to stress a disturbance (Krauss calls it an erosion) of the metonymic naming of the parts which Barthes constitutes as an 'exchange,' which undertakes to 'abolish' or 'vacillate' meaning (1972: 245).⁸ And it is in the crossing of these two chains of

⁷ There is insufficient space here to discuss Bois and Krauss' 'formless' project. These notions of disturbance or erosion are well summarised by James Elkins in reference to Krauss' *The Optical Unconscious* as he outlines a notion of formlessness: "The *inform*... is a 'disturbance... in the modality of *alteration*, of ambivalence,' so that there can no longer be a stable distinction between figure and ground, or any pair of 'alternating' opposites. Nothing is secure, and forms and figures vacillate or shimmer rather than oscillate in a regular motion. The *inform* is a principle that works against the concepts of antimony, binarism, opposition, structure, and ultimately, figure itself" (1998: 106).

See chapter 6 (*Morphological Ambivalence in the Partial Object/Subject*) of my PhD thesis (Braddock 2008).

⁸ In a footnote Barthes alerts us that his analysis refers to Roman Jakobson's opposition "...between metaphor, a figure of similarity, and metonymy, a figure of contiguity" (1972: 245n242). See Jakobson, Roman (1987), *Language in literature*, eds Krystyna Pomorska and

metaphoric association, 'a transfer of meaning from one chain to the other,' that Barthes posits the metonymic: "...eye sucked like a breast, my eye sipped by her lips..." (1972: 245). And Barthes employs the term 'contagion' of qualities and actions that is to pull out the eyeball and play with it erotically or "...to bite into the bull's testicle as if it were an egg or to insert it in one's own body..." (1972: 245).

For example, the ritual of the Catholic Eucharist constitutes a number of metaphoric substitutions, two of which are eating a shared meal together and the eating of another's flesh. The crossing of these metaphoric chains becomes what Barthes refers to as a metonymic forced syntagm. Such a crossing of the metaphoric chains results in ambivalence, erosion of meaning, and disappointment, alluding to the axis of metonymy as the axis of desire. Here desire is the name for that which one will never have and what this object will never be for me. That Frankovich did not appear for *Flying Fox*, other than her leg jutting from an upstairs window, indicates the power of the metonymic action crucial to her performative-object. Her leg metaphorically stands in for a whole episode in her life as (failed) gymnast—the substitutions of ballet/sports shoe and the leg 'frozen' in aerial cartwheel—while the rest of her (unseen body) is the redundancy charged with potential. Or, put another way, *Flying Fox* brings into play two axes of metaphoric substitution, the artist and gymnast, where the crossing of these metaphoric chains forms the metonymy of a forced syntagm. This sense of forced meaning can be interpreted in other ways still: we, her audience, are caught in our desire to move upstairs in order to view the 'whole' object; or for the leg to 'do something'; or for the performance to 'finish' in some manner or other. In this light think how Frankovich's audience at the 1992 National New Zealand Championships, in seeing her unable to perform, yearned for her legs to move fluently, and for her to complete the programme. To reiterate at this point, the metonymical axis of contagion is a highly useful mechanism for discussing the axis of desire constituting all the parts of the whole that we will never attain. In this light, modes of engagement and participation are activated through an analysis of the viewing subject. This describes a form of haptic encounter that draws out the viewer's desires.

As such, the term 'part object' denotes a part of a whole never recoverable and therefore might be analysed in relation to what it is not, what is left out. This is to induce notions of redundancy or lack, severance and shortfall. In their partiality, part objects imply a larger whole but it is in their lack of representational fixity that their force resides. It is this partiality that urges Gaby Hartel to invoke the words of Mallarmé in relation to the repetitive and partial images in Ugo Rondinone's *The evening passes like any other...* (1998)⁹: "To name an object is to get rid of three-quarters of the enjoyment of the poem... to suggest it – there's the dream" (2006: 244). Part objects and images have a function in *doing* or *producing* in difference to

Stephen Rudy (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press), 113, as quoted by Taussig (1993: 262n210).

⁹ The full title of this work by Ugo Rondinone is: *The evening passes like any other. Men and woman float alone through the air. They drift past my window like the weather. I close my eyes. My heart is a moth fluttering against the walls of my chest. My brain is a tangle of spiders wriggling and roaming around. A wriggling tangling of wriggling spiders* (1998).

representing.

To reiterate, this concept includes conveying meaning through redundancy in the enumeration of the parts of an object or image. This notion of redundancy might be understood as the ‘noise’ of that which is extraneous or excessive to a message. In this context metaphor establishes a field of possible substitutions or meanings. Metonymy, on the other hand, is generally thought of as a syntactical axis in that it establishes the possible concrete adjacencies of signifiers in syntactical units of meaning.¹⁰

The operations of metaphor and metonymy, as stated above, are employed by writers such as Phelan and Stiles in discussing the problem of how the ‘live’ moment might be recorded. My aim here is to apply some of those discussions to the deliberately short-lived characteristics of one-day-sculpture and to ask how a so-called dilemma in the force of the momentary might performatively engage audiences in profound ways.

In précis, Phelan points to metaphor’s role as securing value and reproduction. In this sense, metaphor ‘documents’ the live (substitutions and repetitions). Metonymy is viewed as additive and associative; it works to displace the ‘document’ *in* the moment of the ‘live.’ And in the ‘plenitude’ of that moment “...the performer actually disappears and represents something else—dance, movement, sound, character, ‘art’” (Phelan 1993: 150). In this respect, performance highlights an impossibility of being in the present moment other than by its reproduction or supplement.¹¹

¹⁰ In précis, metaphor plays a synchronic field of substitutions or repetitions constitutive of a (vertical) paradigmatic axis. Metonymy’s temporality operates the additive and dislocative syntagmatic chain. It is with metonymy, as Barthes suggests, that violations happen as chains of metaphors cross in the poetics of forced syntagms.

¹¹ There is insufficient space in the context of this symposium paper to outline Phelan’s reference to Jacques Derrida’s notion of the supplement. See my PhD thesis, *The Artist Will Be Present: Performing Partial Objects and Subjects* (Braddock 2008: 205-219). Derrida does not want ritual to be viewed as a structural determinate of every mark but rather, as a possible occurrence (1988: 15). He makes the point that: “This structural possibility of being weaned from the referent or from the signified (hence from communication and from its context) seems to me to make every mark... the nonpresent *remainder* of a differential mark cut off from its putative ‘production’ or origin” (1988: 10). Elsewhere in “...That Dangerous Supplement...” Derrida presses the point that what I am calling the *force of the moment* is only legible through its absence: “A terrifying menace, the supplement is also the first and surest protection; against that very menace. This is why it cannot be given up” (1976: 154). Phelan argues that “...the performative speech act shares with the ontology of performance the inability to be reproduced or repeated” (1993: 149). While she does not use J. L. Austin’s example, she says this because the ‘I do’ is to do something at that live moment. To repeat that performative utterance is to describe or denote that moment in what Austin termed a constative utterance. From this viewpoint repetition destroys performativity in the strict manner in which Phelan adheres to the unrecorded, unrepeatable moment of live art’s enactment. This is a problematic observation as it ties a notion of performative utterance to the possibility of a ‘pure’ moment. See my PhD thesis which outlines my main objection to at least part of Phelan’s argument (Braddock 2008: 210). I highlight that there is never a ‘live’ moment as it is *already* encountered. It would be ‘impossible’ or ‘undecidable’ in Derrida’s questioning of the ‘now.’ In her contrasting the notions of preservation and disappearance, she would make the live moment the ‘original’ and it is only because of the supplement that

On the one hand, Phelan stresses an unconditional uniqueness of live art that, if saved in any reproductive technology, is at odds with performance's fundamental ontology of disappearance. On the other, her overarching concern with performative writing underscores her quest to see a way through to finding a form of documentation/reproduction that is itself performative.¹²

When Phelan positions the body of the performer as metonymic she suggests that this body fails to reproduce the referent, indicating an "...inability to secure the relation between subjectivity and the body *per se* [and in this sense] performance uses the body to frame the lack of Being promised by and through the body—that which cannot appear without a supplement" (1993: 150-151).

Phelan's argument, more sophisticated than Stiles' but based on similar objectives, aligns metaphor with representation and substitution and to a possibility of 'complete' presence, while metonymy is employed as that which violates its presence in the moment of the 'live.' Phelan nails this viewpoint when she writes that: "In employing the body metonymically, performance is capable of resisting the reproduction of metaphor..." (1993: 151).¹³ A problem I perceive with this discussion is that it risks reiterating the binary that the supplement deconstructs, reinstating a metaphysics of presence and an artifice of representation. The point to be made is that the temporal nature of the metonymic is only identifiable through reproduction, due to its iterability. This is the body of the artist as trace of its own presence. In this way Frankovich's partial subjects/objects mark out the impossibility of their 'pure' reiteration at the point of their originating 'live' moment.

the original can be discussed, albeit always already contaminated. Here Derrida writes that "...the indefinite process of supplementarity has always already *infiltrated* presence, always already inscribed there the space of repetition and the splitting of the self" (1976: 163). So my problem with Phelan's argument lies in the opposition of preservation and disappearance. Every presentation is made possible on the grounds of disappearance and something must be preserved for disappearance to happen. Once again, as Derrida writes, "...this operation of supplementation is not exhibited as a break in presence but rather as a continuous and homogeneous reparation and modification of presence in the representation" (1988: 5).

On this notion of the supplement see Adrian Heathfield and Amelia Jones who write: "The supplement, precisely that which exceeds signification and promises but forever fails to deliver presence, critically dismantles this reliance [on the 'live' moment] by exposing its limits. All live art plays with or relies on the paradox of the supplement (the way in which the live body promises something 'more' than representation but always already fails to give that which can secure meaning (the real, or immortality) once and forever)" (2007: 3).

See Jones who elsewhere traces these points also with reference to Derrida's "...That Dangerous Supplement..." (1998: 34-35).

¹² On this notion of performative writing, Phelan notes: "The challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of writing itself. The act of writing towards disappearance, rather than the act of writing toward preservation, must remember that the after-effect of disappearance is the experience of subjectivity itself" (Phelan 1993: 148).

¹³ Phelan goes on to say that the metaphor that concerns her is the metaphor of gender, that "...the metaphor of gender presupposes unified bodies which are biologically different" (1993: 151).

In this regard Frankovich's body fails to reproduce a defined sense of meaning. The spectator's gaze, in Phelan's analysis, functions, as the supplement might, to secure and displace the 'floating signifier' of the performing body (Phelan 1993: 150). In this case literally the floating leg. It is this violation of representation that constitutes Frankovich's body as metonymic.



ALICIA FRANKOVICH, *FLYING FOX*, 2008

This approach positions the artist in ambivalent ritual circumstances: 'in the mix' of getting performed.¹⁴ This is close to what Stiles means when she states that metonymic processes present objects as "...born in an event and where the artist becomes both a subject who produces an object, and the object itself" (1998: 306). In other words, Frankovich is both the subject and object of her work.¹⁵

¹⁴ The idea of 'getting performed' is employed by Jones in her 'body art' project. She wants to unravel the systems and structures that allow us to interpret the objects of performance. In her analysis of Jackson Pollock, where she coins the term 'Pollockian performative,' her specific concern is to "...interrogate the normative values inscribed in the trope of the artist genius epitomized by the modernist Jackson Pollock..." (1998: 103). She notes that the artist is "...self-consciously performed through new, openly intersubjective contexts (including video or ironized modes of photographic display) which insist upon the openness of this and all subjects to the other" (1998: 67). She is interested in how Pollock 'gets performed' by an innumerable number of interpretive contexts such as artist, photographer, critic, historian and, over any period of time, contemporary and historical (1998: 268n241).

¹⁵ In "Uncorrupted Joy: International Art Actions" Stiles employs the terms of metaphor and metonymy in the context of objects and their relationship to performative acts. She seeks an "...augmentation of the metaphorical capacities of conventional static forms of art with the communicative function of metonymy, wherein artists as 'receivers,' visualize worlds of experience experienced, showing themselves as connected to what society itself transmits" (1998: 329). Earlier she writes: "For by literally acting in the space between a human viewing subject and the conventional art object—as the mediator between the two—the artists who produced action paintings and later actions, exhibited the intersection where subjects meet object, where the artifactuality of the object is born in the event, and where the artist becomes both a subject who produces an object, and the object itself. Such art exhibits how the metonymic process precedes the signifying capabilities of metaphor (objectified in representational objects)" (1998: 306). In this context the very special status of performance as an altered communicative means enables the possibilities of contiguity or contagion to be activated. It complicates the metaphorical associations of the apparent body in the object by

In this context Stiles equates metaphorical capacities with conventional static forms of art—those evoking scopic recognition—and the function of metonymy as a performative action “...acting in the space between a human viewing subject and the conventional art object...” (1998: 306) and therefore soliciting modes of haptic encounter in difference to the scopic.¹⁶ The rarefaction that occurs in the art context—that which one-day-sculpture provokes—self-consciously removes action from ‘normal’ circulation and permits, in the words of Barthes, “...a counterdivision of objects, usages, meaning, spaces and properties...” (1972: 246).

In conclusion, I am interested in the notion of the partial subject/object—particularly where artists employ their own bodies in an ambiguous interchangeability between subject and object—and a risk of failure, lameness or absence in that enterprise. And these endeavours are marked with an obsession for process in difference to a quest for completion. It is always about getting there. These endeavours provoke a violation of representational unity and comprehensible duration. It is precisely in this risk of representational failure—in only offering up parts subjects and objects in unstable moments—that these works draw-out the desires of their audiences for completion. I argue that these are participatory and performative modes of production.

This is why Frankovich presents her body in lame parts and will not record her works in live duration. These ways of making artworks are designed to underscore all that we cannot see: we only ever have a part. They are calculated to emphasise formal partialness and durational failure. Our yearning for more underscores our desire for that which we cannot have and constitutes a profound form of engagement. This is the *force of the moment* that questions formal closure and longevity.

compellingly ‘exhibiting’ the intimacy of the juncture where subjects meet object. A similar argument might be put forward for the special status of the one-day-sculpture event.

¹⁶ Stiles argues that the rarefaction of such performative events self-consciously removes artists from circulation as metonymic figures in action—something ‘incorporeal and intangible’ as she argues for metonymy as action “...enabling one to perceive the contiguity of relations between two things.” And she goes on to note that: “When such connection includes human relations, it may have the effect of reducing human actions ‘to a less complex and usually more concrete realm of being.’ These qualities are of particular relevance to the function and structure of the altered communicative means of live, performed art.” And a little later she writes that: “Such art exhibits how the metonymic process precedes the signifying capabilities of metaphor (objectified in representational objects)” (1998: 306).¹⁶ I want to expand on (and disagree with) this argument in that, as a metonymic figure, Frankovich is precisely *more* corporeal and tangible (and of the moment) as part of the whole: *all* leg. And the redundancy (formlessness) that lies at the heart of this vacillation is all those parts of her that are left out. This vacillation (contrary to Stiles) cannot ‘precede the signifying capabilities of metaphor’ in that one cannot have a horizontal metonymic axis of contiguity without an implied vertical metaphoric one (this would be a structural rule without context; the grammar of a sentence without syntagms, rules for a wedding without performing the ceremony).

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